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CLD-125    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               
No. 07-4150
                               
SEAN PRESSLEY,
                                                                                 Appellant
v.
SUPT. J. BEARD, Commissioner; M. HORN, Commissioner; S. BURKS, Former Chief
Grievance Coordinator; MR. T. JAMES, Former Chief Grievance Coordinator; ACTING
SUPT. KYLER, Acting Chief Grievance Coordinator; R. BITNER, Chief H/E; REISING,
Acting Chief H/E; T. GENT, West Region Para.; C. MARAVICH, Atty. Gen.; M.
MILLS-DAVIS, Asst. Counsel; W. STICKMAN, Superintendent; C. BLAINE, JR.,
Former Superintendent; J. MILLER, Deputy; STOWITZKY, Admin., T. JACKSON,
Deputy Superintendent; D. DAVIS, Admin. Assistant; S. D’ELETTO, Grievance
Coordinator; D. GRAINEY, Captain; J. MARTIN, Captain; W. LEGGETT, Lieutenant;
LT. REED, Lieutenant; GAMBARVIC, Lieutenant; COUNSELOR ODDO, Lieutenant;
C.O.I. MARTIN, Lieutenant; MAYO, Lieutenant; MRS. STEWART; JULLIAN.,
Sergeant; SAGER, Sergeant; LIPSCOMB, Sergeant; MITCHELL, Sergeant; MAJOR
STEWART, Sergeant; BERTHELOTTE; KIRBY, Sergeant; LOHR, Sergeant; JOHN
DOE #1, Sergeant; HASSETT, Major; D. GREEHRING, Mail Superintendent; J.
SCOTT, Business Manager; M. SMOLDER, Business Manager; C. MORELL, Corr.
Prin.; M. KELLY, Former Coor. Prin.; D. SOCHKO, Former Acting Coordinator Prin.;
C. TURNER, Lid.; SEBEK, Assistant. Lid.; RAMBLER, Coor. Officer; MANSBERRY,
Coor. Officer; UNKNOWN MAIL INSPECTORS; D. KELCHNER, Superintendent; J.
PALAKOVICH, Deputy Superintendent; PATTON, Deputy; ASST. DPTY
SECRETARY BRANNIGAN, Deputy Superintendent; I. TAGGART, Superintendent
Assistant; GARRETT, Major; R. MARSH, Unit Manager; B. STEIGERWALT, Former
Unit Manager; RHODES, Lieutenant; KRIEGHTER, Sergeant; WIELDER, Sergeant;
C.O. HUBER, Corrections Officer; CORRECTIONS OFFICER 8; MR. STUBBS; #2
JOHN DOE, Corrections Officer; J. MINAYA, Coor. Prin.; L. ZHONG, Officer Lib.; R.
GAMBLE, Business Manager; B. HARRIS, Mail Super; #3 JOHN DOES, Corrections
Officer; JOHN DOE #4, Corrections Officer; JOHN DOES #5, Corrections Officer
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02535)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
                                                                         
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action 
Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 7, 2008
Before:  AMBRO, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 26, 2008)
                                
OPINION
                                 
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  For the
following reasons, we will summarily affirm.  See 3rd Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
Sean Pressley, a state prisoner currently incarcerated in the State Correctional
Institution at Mahanoy, filed a civil rights action in the District Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.  Pressley made numerous allegations accusing prison officials at State
Correctional Institution-Camp Hill, where he was previously incarcerated, of preventing
him from accessing the courts, hindering the free exercise of his religious beliefs, and
retaliating against him for filing lawsuits.  The claims span the time period from June
2000 until the filing of the complaint in 2004.  On September 26, 2005, pursuant to its
3screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the District Court entered an order
dismissing sixteen of the sixty named defendants.  On September 26, 2007, based largely
on Pressley’s deposition and the affidavits of prison officials, the District Court granted
the remaining defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case as to all
parties.  
We will exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Pressley’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Tourscher v. McCullough 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  We also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
grant of Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.  See Whitfield v. Radian Guar., Inc.,
501 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2007).  We apply the same standard in reviewing a motion for
summary judgment as the District Court.  Id.  A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Several named defendants, such as the Secretaries of the Department of
Corrections or Superintendents, were named only for their supervisory roles in the prison
system.  The District Court properly dismissed these defendants and any additional
defendants who were sued based on their failure to take corrective action when
grievances or investigations were referred to them.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation
of respondeat superior); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996)
4(state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause).  In addition, the District Court properly dismissed any individuals
named in the caption but not named in the complaint.  Pressley did not allege that these
defendants personally violated his civil rights.               
We also find that Pressley’s claims against the remaining defendants did not raise
any genuine issues of material fact.  Pressley contended that, on several occasions, prison
officials refused to honor his request for legal materials from the prison law library,
confiscated legal materials in his possession, and denied him the ability to possess boxes
of legal materials in his cell.  Further, Pressley accused prison officials of opening legal
correspondence outside his presence, refusing to provide him with postage, and refusing
to notarize his legal documents.  As a result of the prison officials’ actions, Pressley
claimed that he missed deadlines in various cases he has pending in federal court. 
For the reasons substantially given by the District Court, Pressley failed on
summary judgment to show any “actual injury” resulting from the alleged denial of his
right to court access.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996).  Pressley, in his
deposition, could not point to any missed deadlines that resulted in a “loss or rejection of
a legal claim.”  See Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).  The District
Court properly disregarded Pressley’s attempts to contradict his deposition in his
opposition to the summary judgment motion.  See Martin v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1988) (permissible for a district court to
disregard contradictory affidavit for purposes of whether there is a material dispute of
5fact).  Also, Pressley failed to present evidence that he was injured by the Defendants as
to his filings in Pressley v. Horn, C.A. No. 04-2150 (3d Cir. 2006).  Specifically, Pressley
did not point to any particular deadline missed or any prejudice he suffered as a result of
the prison officials’ alleged actions.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 508
F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2007) (in response to a summary judgment motion plaintiff must
set forth specific facts supported by affidavit or other evidence).         
Pressley’s claim that prison officials and regulations frustrated the free exercise of
his religion is also unpersuasive.  Pressley, a Muslim, accused prison officials of
confiscating his hard-bound Koran, prayer rug, and kufi which frustrated the free exercise
of his religion.  The confiscation of Pressley’s hard-bound religious materials and prayer
rug was intended to further “legitimate penological objectives.”  Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 87 (1987).  When the free exercise claim arose, Pressley was subject to
heightened security restrictions due to his placement in the Special Management Unit at
SCI-Camp Hill.  See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 240-42 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing
the history and special penological purpose of the SMU at Camp Hill).  According to the
affidavit of Richard Southers, a Unit Manager of the SMU, a hard-bound book could be
disassembled to make a weapon and the rug could be used to conceal contraband and/or
weapons.  Further, the Islamic Chaplain at SCI-Camp Hill stated that other Muslims
confined in the SMU are able to practice their faith without access to a prayer rug or a
hard-bound copy of the Koran and inmates are allowed to wear kufis.  The only evidence
offered by Pressley to rebut the affidavits were proposed alternative prison policies and
6not evidence indicating that he could not practice his faith without hard-bound volumes
and/or prayer rugs; therefore, summary judgment was also properly granted on this issue. 
See Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 581 (3d Cir.
1986) (in reviewing grant of summary judgment, appellate court cannot ignore
uncontested facts that render inferences unreasonable).  The District Court also did not err
in concluding that the costs of Pressley’s proposed alternative restrictions, such as passing
out prayer rugs five times a day, would impose a burden on the prison and could
potentially expose the staff to additional risks.  
Finally, for the reasons given by the District Court, there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding Pressley’s retaliation claims.  Pressley asserted that a correctional
officer failed to notarize one of his documents and another officer confiscated legal
materials from his cell, both in retaliation for complaints he filed.  The record reveals,
however, that the document was not notarized because prison officials felt that no notary
seal was necessary and in his deposition testimony Pressley admits that the documents
were eventually notarized.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (in
order to prove a prima facie case of retaliation prisoner must show causal link between
the exercise of constitutional rights and adverse action taken against him).  Further, the
legal materials were confiscated because generally applicable prison regulations provide
that an inmate is not permitted to retain excess photocopies and reference material in his
cell.  See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) (retaliation claim fails if
adverse action is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest).           
7Accordingly, because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3rd Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
